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LA WF ARE: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS 
Tawia Ansah• 
This Article offers a rhetorical analysis of the term "lawfare. " It 
examines the term within the context of its historical genesis, and reviews its 
evolving definition. Drawing upon insights from non-legal disciplines, the 
Article argues that rhetorically, "lawfare" indicates alternative and critical 
ways to think of law in relation to war. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In an essay published shortly after the events of 9/11 and the U.S. 
responsive attack on Afghanistan, Colonel (as he then was; now Major 
General) Charles J. Dunlap Jr., U.S. Air Force attorney (JAG), introduced 
the term "lawfare" within the discourse on law and war. 1 In Dunlap's essay, 
the term had the specific meaning of indexing law itself as a weapon and a 
• LL.B. (Toronto), Ph.D. (Columbia). Visiting Professor, Case Western Reserve School 
of Law. Professor of Law, New England Law Boston. I am grateful to Professor Michael 
Scharf for inviting me to moderate a panel at the "Lawfare!" conference at Case on Septem-
ber 10-11, 2010. I thank Dean Robert Rawson for a summer stipend. My thanks to Professor 
Jessie Hill for reading an earlier draft and for her invaluable comments and critiques; to 
Professor Bob Strassfeld for helpful discussions on the Article's themes; to Ms. Kirsten 
Resnick for research assistance; and to the student editors at JIL, whose detailed comments 
improved the quality of the prose. 
1 See generally Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserv-
ing Humanitarian Values in 21si Conflicts (Nov. 29, 2001) (unpublished paper presented at 
Harvard University, Carr Center, Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Confe-
rence, available at http://www.duke.edu/- pfeaver/dunlap.pdf. 
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strategy of war. 2 But Dunlap's use of "lawfare" also implied various signifi-
cations having to do with the broader issue of the parameters of law in rela-
tion to war, and of both law and war in relation to the exercise of govern-
mental power. Several years later, in an essay published in 2009, Dunlap 
"refined" his own definition of the term "lawfare,"3 taking account of the 
subsequent career of the "war on terror. "4 
In this brief essay, I propose a rhetorical analysis of law fare . 5 I will 
be concerned with both Dunlap's intended meanings and the textual impli-
cations and latent significations within the discourse on law and war from 
which the term "lawfare" evolves and which it references. That is, I want to 
know what ideas attach to law and to war as specific human products, and 
how lawfare expresses ideas about each of them, and to ideas about their 
interrelationship. At its simplest, a rhetorical analysis suggests that lawfare 
might express a certain expansiveness of law in relation to war, and vice 
versa. Lawfare might also index the limits of law's idiom as war, as well as 
war's representation of law. Rhetorically, then, "lawfare" projects the will 
to expansion between law and war, inter se. And linguistically, it subtends 
the point at which "law" and "war" are contained within, and constrained 
by, each other. 
2 Id. at 2. 
3 The second article was published in a military law journal. See Major General Charles J. 
Dunlap, Jr., law/are : A Decisive Element of 21'1 Century Conflicts? 34 JOINT FORCE 
QUARTERLY 54 (3rd quarter 2009), at 35. 
4 The term itself is not without controversy. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Obama 's War Over 
Terror, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 20 I 0, at A3, http://www.nytimes.com/20I0/01/17 /magazine/I 7 
Terror-t.html?pagewanted=all (Rather than seeing terrorism as the challenge of our time, 
Obama rejects the phrase "war on terror" altogether, hoping to recast the struggle as only one 
of a number of vital challenges confronting America. The nation is at war with al-Qaeda, 
Obama says, but not with terrorism, which, as he understands it, is a tactic, not an enemy). 
See also, e.g., Conor Gearty, The Superpatriotic Fervour of the Moment, Review Article of 
Bruce Ackerman's Before The Next Attack, Preserving Civil liberties in an Age of Terrorism 
(citation omitted), 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 183 (2008) at 183 ("The attacks on New York 
and Washington on 11 September, 2001 have provided the casus for this phantom bel/i and 
repetition of the supposed fact of this war by senior officials in the Bush administration, 
including the President himself, has gradually- in true post-modernist style- made it true."). 
Gearty posits a strong opposition both to the "war on terror," the war paradigm it encapsu-
lates, and the consequent conception of law as "excluded" thereby. Gearty posits a strong 
opposition both to the "war on terror," the war paradigm it encapsulates, and the consequent 
conception of law as "excluded" thereby. Gearty posits a strong opposition both to the "war 
on terror," the war paradigm it encapsulates, and the consequent conception of law as "ex-
cluded" thereby. 
5 See, e.g., Peter Brooks, Reading Law Reading; Or, literature as law's Other (Prince-
ton Mellon Seminar, Spring 2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-
workshops/brooks-reading-law-reading.pdf (last visited June l, 2010) at 12 (explaining that a 
rhetoric or "poetics" of lawfare might "force [one] to confront the textuality and rhetoricity 
of the law, the ways in which it makes meaning as well as the meanings it makes."). 
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The dual themes, then, in this rhetorical analysis of lawfare are ex-
pansion and containment. The working thesis is that conceptually, we think 
of war as an alternative to law, a deeply felt mythology captured in Cicero's 
famous saying in Pro Milone, "inter armes silent leges," or "during war, law 
is silent." Likewise, we think of law as a constraint upon the sovereign's 
power to declare and conduct war. In that mythology, war is violent and 
irrational, while law is pacific, deliberative, and rational. But of course the 
relationship between law and war is more complicated: war is itself a "con-
struct" of law,6 just as much as war, ontologically, tests the basis and the 
limits oflaw.7 
At any given historical moment, these ideas and mythologies are 
given greater or lesser expression. Lawfare indexes a specific shape to the 
ideas we harbor about the relationship between law and war. Thus, "law-
fare" as a term of art has its own specific, intended, and, indeed, doctrinal 
definitions, and the literature on lawfare within the past decade certainly 
attests to this. 8 
What this Article hopes to contribute is a sense of the implied 
meanings and projected significations beyond doctrinal definition. The dep-
loyment of lawfare registers the extent to which a conception of law as for-
malistic and instrumental to war has become normative. The point of a rhe-
torical analysis of lawfare is to index a recognition of this and to interrogate 
the consequences for law outside of the war context. The object is to treat 
lawfare as a "threshold" concept between law and war, and thereby exca-
vate the potential for alternative meaning-production. The object is to think 
through lawfare as a term that captures a certain meaning of law in order to 
apprehend alternative ways of thinking, more objectively and less naively 
(mythically) about law in relation to war. 
Lawfare's doctrinal meaning, as described in Parts I and II, suggests 
a bounded, or enclosed, conception of law within which law's relationship 
to war subtends law's capture and colonization by war: the more "war" is 
indexed as metaphor in legal discourse, and the more this reflects the en-
trenchment of a war paradigm governing legal thought, the more law be-
6 Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Con-
strnction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. l (2004). 
7 See, e.g., CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
Jus PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM, (G.L. Ulmen trans., Telos, 2006)(discussing origins of law in 
relation to different forms of war; e.g., "The essential point is that, within the Christian 
sphere, wars among Christian princes were bracketed wars. They were distinguished from 
wars against non-Christian princes and peoples," etc., at 58). 
8 See, e.g., Brooke Goldstein, Aaron Eitan Meyer, Legal Jihad: How Islamist Lawfare 
Tactics are Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 395 (2009); Tung Yin, 
Boumediene and Law/are, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 865 (2009); Colonel Kelly D. Wheaton, Stra-
tegic Lawyering: Realizing the Potential of Military Lawyers at the Strategic Level, ARMY 
LAW., Sept. 2006. 
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comes pregnant with war value. Lawfare, doctrinally, represents the loss of 
a sense of law as other in relation to war. In the alternative, however, law-
fare imagined as a threshold concept might point to the recognition of a 
conception of law that maintains a relationship-----contingent, provisional, 
historical, and imperfect-with war rather than a seamless collapse within 
it. 
At stake, then, in a rhetorical analysis of lawfare is both a critique 
of the war paradigm that it represents and enforces, and a recognition of the 
contingency of law in relation to the paradigm, whatever that paradigm is, 
within which it is situated. What I hope to establish in this Article is the 
relational aspect of law. Lawfare as projection and the case study, so to 
speak, of the "war on terror," makes stark how important it is to remember 
that law is never pure, is always contextual. Law cannot be divorced from 
its milieu. Thus, a rhetorical analysis of lawfare allows us to look at law 
more objectively, to see what has happened to law, under the aegis of war. 
In Part II, I review the nexus of law and war from a historical and 
doctrinal perspective and I analyze the discourses of power contemporane-
ous to lawfare's early deployment within the context of the "war on terror." 
The question here will be how much lawfare imports, and reflects its pre-
2001 history. In Part III, I review Dunlap's evolving definitions of the term. 
In Part IV, drawing upon analytical methodologies outside law (e.g., theol-
ogy and psychoanalysis) to underline the concept of law as relational both 
within and beyond the war model, I see lawfare as a threshold concept and 
as a "passage." This enables me to look at the conflicting desires and in-
vestments harbored by the term in its deployment as an instrument of war 
andoflaw. 
In the result, I conclude that lawfare represents a traditionally 
bounded or "determinate" view of law in relation to war. This view renders 
the law-war nexus dyadic and inevitable: expansion and constraint on the 
continuum between war and the criminal justice system ratifies law as the 
legitimation and the formal/instrumental expression, merely, of different 
forms of violence. A critique of lawfare from a rhetorical perspective sub-
mits a relational view of law ,9 a view that requires thinking of law as always 
and already "related" to an outside or a beyond of the law/war nexus. 
Whence, what will "constrain" or attenuate the resort to war (and the ac-
9 This will be explored in Part III and the Conclusion. For an idea of a "relational" theory 
of law, I borrow from Ahsan Mirza's review of Foucau/t 's Law, Ahsan Mirza, Book Note, 47 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 617 (2009) (reviewing PETER FITZPATRICK & BEN GOLDER, FOUCAULT'S 
LAW (2009)). Mirza notes that contrary to the popular "expulsion" theory of law in Fou-
cault's thought, law in Foucault's modernity is '"the uneasy, ambivalent relation' between 
'law as a determinate and contained entity' and 'law as thoroughly illimitable and as respon-
sive to what lies outside or beyond its position for the time being,' 'law as a law of possibili-
ty, contingency, and liability."' Id. at 618. 
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quiescence in a "war paradigm" 10 to resolve conflicts) may not be law in the 
traditional sense of an opposition between the war paradigm and crime pa-
radigm.11 Rather, war-or, perhaps more precisely, dehumanizing vi-
olence, 12 including the violence of the law- may be constrained by a con-
ception of law that embodies relational thought. 
I borrow from theology and psychoanalysis to suggest that the more 
formal or bounded view of law already harbors this juridical desire in rela-
tion to war, but that the war paradigm suppresses and elides it-again, and 
as such, as an aspect of the paradigm itself. Thinking of lawfare, then, 
beyond its definitional limits to its linguistic and cultural significations-
that is, figuring lawfare as a border13 concept between law and not law, war 
and not war-gives us a sense of its potential discursive deployment as cri-
tique of the war paradigm. 14 
10 Ganesh Sitaraman notes that the "war paradigm" must be inclusive of"a hybrid model 
of law, between war and crime, that is better tailored to terrorists' tactics." He suggests that 
the paradigm include counterinsurgency, the current strategy in the war in Afghanistan. See 
Ganesh Sitararn, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 1745, 1833 (2009). 
11 But cf Gearty, supra note 4, at 7 (As an alternative to the war paradigm, "What does 
exist is a framework of criminal law which is informed by principle certainly and controlled 
to some degree ... by a range of more or less embedded rights but which is nevertheless 
always on the move, the substance of the crimes themselves and the procedural framework 
for their determination and punishment being in a perpetual state of flux."). 
12 This aspect of warfare was vividly presented in a recent PBS, Frontline: The Wounded 
Platoon (PBS May 17, 2010), on soldiers returning from the war zone and suffering from 
PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder). The soldiers reported randomly killing civilians on the 
slightest pretext. As one soldier put it: "It didn't matter whether they were armed or not. 
They were simply 'hajjis,' they weren't human." A psychologist advised the solder that, 
"You had to dehumanize the enemy in order to kill him . . . What you're suffering is a 'nor-
mal' response to an 'abnormal' situation. Thaw was abnormal; this is normal." 
13 See, e.g., Simon Addison, Book Review, 21 J. REFUGEE STUD. 414 (reviewing 
BORDERSCAPES: HIDDEN GEOGRAPHIES AND POLITICS AT TERRITORY'S EDGE (Prem Kumar 
Rajararn & Carl Grundy-Warr eds. U. of Minnesota P., 2007) (the border is "a relational 
practice for the production of otherness. The border ... is a multivalent and constantly con-
tested process through which the limits of sovereign power and the boundaries of political 
community are negotiated." Addison notes further that to analyze the border "only in terms 
of law ' repeats the ruse of sovereign control and rationality integral to the maintenance of 
sovereign power."'). 
14 Critiques of the war paradigm include Amos Guiora, Self-Defense: from the Wild West 
to 9111: Who, What, When, 41 CORNELL INT' L L.J. 631 (2008); Kathryn L. Einspanier, Note, 
Burlamaqui, the Constitution, and the Imperfect War on Terror, 96 GEO. L.J. 985 (2008); 
Christina D. Elmore, Comment, An Enemy Within Our Midst: Distinguishing Combatants 
from Civilians in the War against Terrorism, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 213 (2008) (war paradigm 
based on an "antiquated state-based model," at 231 ); Mark R. Shulman, The Four Freedoms: 
Good Neighbors Make Good law and Good Policy in a Time of Insecurity, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 555 (2008) ("state-centeredness of a war paradigm" gives "higher profile and more 
opportunities" to al-Qaeda, at 577). But cf David Glazier, Playing By the Rules: Combating 
Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARYL. REv. 957, 983 (2009) ("A principle 
advantage of the war paradigm is that it is self-limiting. There a{e formal legal prerequisites 
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II. WARBYLAW 
Lawfare as a border concept expresses and projects conflicting de-
sires concerning the relationship between law and war. In this first part, I 
review the historical context of lawfare's origins (as a legal term). Here, I 
look at the doctrine of the international laws of war, and the debates around 
American power before 9/11. As I will argue in Part III, lawfare expresses a 
strict view of the war as separate from international legal limits (law "and" 
war), but also continuous with, and legitimated by, domestic law as such. 
This latter view maintains the basic rubric of lawfare as paradigmatic of the 
war framework. 
A. Law as War 
There has been much criticism of the war paradigm (or the war 
framework) used to characterize the 9/11 events and the subsequent U.S. 
response. One element of the critique was that the 9/11 terrorist attack was 
not an "act of war" but rather a "crime," whence the Bush Administration's 
resort to a "war" rather than the criminal justice paradigm in pursuing its 
remedies was fatally flawed. 15 Following what the critics consider this orig-
inal error, the problem of how to characterize and adjudicate those captured 
by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and other places where the terrorists were 
sought led to a protracted debate about how to treat the detainees. 16 The 
debate centered on whether the detainees should be treated as war criminals, 
thereby according them prisoner of war status under the laws of war, or 
whether they should be granted all the procedural protections of ordinary 
criminals under the domestic and international criminal justice laws. 17 
It was within this context that Dunlap introduced the term "law-
fare," and this seemed to index the newness of the legal matrix or pressure 
in relation to this war, or this extension of the modem definition of warfare. 
Nathaniel Berman, however, notes that whilst the relationship between law 
and war is ancient, what does seem new is the extent to which the recent 
events-in which he includes the "fourteen year conflict with Iraq"- have 
destabilized the traditional legal bases for determining the border between 
under both domestic and international law for its lawful invocation."); See also, Matthew C. 
Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Ter-
rorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008) (making a similar argument to Glazier's). 
15 See, e.g., Johannes van Aggelen, The Consequences of Unlawful Preemption and the 
Legal Duty to Protect the Human Rights of its Victims, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 21, 86 
(2009) (report from the High Conunissioner for Human Rights concluding that "the U.S. 
paradigm, by conflicting and confusing acts of terrorism with acts of war, is legally flawed 
and sets a dangerous precedent."). 
16 Q&A: What next for Guantanamo prisoners?, BBC NEWS, JAN. 21, 2002, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/l 773140.strn. 
11 Id. 
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war and not war. 18 With this destabilization, other separations (i.e., this is a 
war; this is not a war but a revolution; etc.) are both unsettled and become 
available to strategic instrumentalization by all sides. I will describe Ber-
man's theory. 
Berman's answer to the question, "what is war?" counters the popu-
lar view that law-whether conceptualized as the criminal justice system or 
as the international prohibition against "wars of aggression"-is designed to 
constrain war. On the contrary, Berman argues, law has always facilitated 
"certain forms of officially sanctioned violence." 19 He writes: 
First, law's role in relation to war is primarily not one of opposition but of 
construction- the facilitation of war through the establishment of a sepa-
rate legal sphere immunizing some organized violence from normal legal 
sanction and, inevitably, privileging certain forms of violence at the ex-
pense of others. Secondly, the forms of this legal construction of war are 
highly contingent, the subject of historical variation and political contesta-
tion. Thirdly, the legal construction of war as a separate sphere has been 
considerably destabilized in our time, in particular by the strategic instru-
mentalization of the legal categories by state and non-state participants in 
violence. Both the ''war on terror" and the fourteen year conflict with Iraq 
provide paradigmatic instances of these phenomena.20 
Berman notes the distinction internal to the laws of war are drawn 
between the right to go to war, the justness of the cause, "jus ad helium," 
and the conduct of the war once a war has begun, the ''jus in bello."21 These 
two have different aims and historically were meant to be separate. The ''jus 
ad bellum" prohibits certain kinds of violence altogether (a war of aggres-
sion, for instance).22 But even if one party begins such a war, both parties 
must conduct themselves according to "jus in hello," also known as "inter-
national humanitarian law."23 "Jus in hello" does not depend upon the just-
ness of the war; it referred only to the conduct, and was based on the moral 
equality of belligerents, whereupon prisoners captured by either side had a 
right to an immunity (privileged combatants). 24 
In the second instance, as Berman notes, the line between the "lex 
specialis" of war and the "lex generalis" of the criminal justice system, 
whether international or domestic, was also "destabilized" by the events of 
the last decade.25 Specifically, was terrorism an "act of war," bringing a 
18 Berman:, supra note 6. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id at 3. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 9. 
2s Id. 
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state's reaction to it within the laws of war (''jus in bello")? Or was it a 
"criminal act," requiring a state's response to be more like a police action 
than a declaration of war?26 
Third, the shifting back and forth between the criminal paradigm 
and the war paradigm exacerbated the destabilized categories-both within 
"lex specialis" and between the laws of war and the criminal justice system. 
Berman's argument is that neither the destabilization nor its strategic in-
strumentalization for partisan advantage by all parties is anything new. 27 As 
such, Berman writes, "Construction, contestation, instrumentalization-
these are the key challenges for understanding the role of law in relation to 
war in our time."28 
Of particular interest here is the last term: Berman notes that a 
greater problem than contesting the boundaries is their instrumentaliza-
tion. 29 It is here that lawfare makes its entrance, i.e., as one form of instru-
mentalizing the contested borders between legal spheres ("lawfare cam-
paigns," to use Dunlap's phrase3°), as well as a descriptive term for the stra-
tegic exploitation of the legal construction of war. As discussed further in 
Part III of this Article, lawfare expresses this constructive sense of legal 
encompassment, of occupying the entire discursive field of the definition of 
war-and not war- including the fact of divisional instability. Lawfare also 
projects a strategic expansiveness, as if to counter the instrumental "lawfare 
campaigns" of the other side. 
Despite the legal construction of war and the posit that law is there-
fore not "opposed" in any juridical sense to war, there is a sense in which 
society reposes such a desire in law, and that this constitutes a powerful 
mythology of law's relation to war. Thus, Berman notes that ''jus ad hel-
ium," especially in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, prohibiting war, is 
often interpreted as giving expression to such a desire. 31 Berman cautions, 
26 Id at 7- 8. 
27 Id at 7 (Some may view this destabilization of the legal construction of war as tending 
to produce a synthesis between the laws of war and not-war; others may view it as tending 
towards the abolition of one or the other sphere. By contrast, I argue that recent trends would 
better be viewed as making the distinction between the two spheres available for strategic 
instrumentalization. Rather than contesting the line between war and not-war, those engaged 
in such instrumentalization employ the distinction itself for partisan advantage- seeking to 
achieve practical or discursive gains through shifting back and forth between war and not-
war."). 
28 Id. at 8. 
29 Id 
30 Dunlap, supra note l , at 36. 
31 Berman, supra note 6, at n.9 (jus ad bellum "enshrined in the League Covenant, the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the UN Charter" designed to oppose war, but "[t]he modem rules 
of jus ad helium, no less than those of jus in bello, thus effect a constructive channeling of 
violence, rather than simply opposing it," citing to the work of Carl Schmitt and Thomas 
Franck). 
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however, that even the intervention of the courts in adjudicating the "terror-
ism" cases may simply highlight the acquiescence of the "constraint" mod-
el- the criminal justice system- in relation to the war paradigm, at its 
height.32 
Even the intervention of the courts, at the height of the govern-
ment's instrumentalization of the unstable border between war and crime, 
largely took the form of judicial acquiescence as the courts expanded the 
parameters of the war paradigm at cost to the "criminal justice" model.33 
Whence, what comes clearest from Berman's analysis of the historical and 
doctrinal relationship between law and war is a strong counter-myth: the 
desire invested in law as "constraint" of war almost vanishes with the atten-
uation of judicial review of the political decision.34 
Parallel to the contentious political debates around the status of 
"enemy (non)combatants" during the last decade, there has also been a kind 
of introspective political discourse on the nature and extension of American 
power in the age of globalism. Much of this debate circulated around the 
idea of America as a new imperial power, and questioned what this might 
mean for how to conceptualize the relationship between law and war. The 
buzzwords in the 1990s and the 2000s----e.g., "hegemony," "unilateralism," 
"exceptionalism"--could be considered variations on the theme of what it 
meant to be the sole superpower, with the rubric of empire35 indexing a 
32 Of the "unprivileged combatants," the subject of this litigation, Berman notes that: 
[this]category and its attendant controversies are thus symptoms of the fact that the legal 
construction of war is both indispensable and never more than provisional- that jus ad hel-
ium both must be and cannot be neutrally separated from jus in hello and that those entitled 
to the rules of jus in hello both must be and cannot be defined in a way that will command 
the assent of all parties to some of the most important conflicts. 
Id. at 57. 
33 Id. at 60 & 70 ("Examination of these cases reveals courts deeply engaged in preserving 
and transforming the legal construction of war in the face of partisan efforts that seek either 
to engage in an unprecedented expansion of its contours or to subject its doctrines to strategic 
instrumentalization."). The only court to "block" the government's attempt to expand of the 
contours of the legal construction of war is the Padilla circuit court. But see also Boume-
dienne and the other "terrorism" cases: whilst the Supreme Court declared the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 a violation of the Suspension Clause of the Constitution and de-
clared that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to the habeas corpus writ, the 
Court did not specify "whether" or "how an applicable guarantee can be enforced": see 
Christina Duffy Burnett, "A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boume-
dienne," 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2009). 
34 Id. at 59 (the courts take various approaches, which Berman labels "formalist," per the 
sovereign declaration; "factualist," where war is defined according to "objective" criteria; 
and "functionalist," where the designation of war did or did not make juridical sense. Thus, 
there is a hint in all this that a more robust judicial review would have indexed "law" as 
"constraint" to the strategic expansion of the war paradigm without limit). 
35 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, "Unilatralism and Constiturionalism," 79 N.Y.U.L.REv. 1971, 
1973 (2004), quoted in Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, and Ryan Goodman, International 
Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morality (3rd ed.) (Ox(ord, 2007), at 54: "In other 
96 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 43:87 
comparison to similar historical unipolar precedents, such as Rome or Great 
Britain. 
B. Law of Empire 
Before and during the time in which "lawfare" was regenerated as a 
legal term of art in relation to the laws and conduct of war, the various 
views on the extension of U.S. power around the globe, particularly in its 
wars- the "humanitarian" wars in the 1990s and post-9111 Afghanistan and 
Iraq---coalesced around the view of America as a new imperial power. 36 
The closest historical analogue to the U.S. version was the British Empire, 
and scholars and commentators looked closely for similarities and differ-
ences, as well as lessons learned. John Fabian Witt37 reviewed four recent 
books on this topic, all centered on the question of law in relation to empire. 
As Witt notes, "Old-fashioned empire is suddenly everywhere. . . Hard 
power is back, and so too are a set of difficult constitutional questions: 
about the Constitution and foreign affairs, about the significance of interna-
tional law, and about the relationship of foreign affairs authority to domestic 
rights and powers, to mention only a few."38 
Witt reduces the "law of empire" in relation to war, or the use of 
force, whether British or American---or "Anglo-American"-to two formu-
lations along ideological lines: the first submits war as external to law, the 
second as internal to law. He writes: 
[T]he Anglo-American law of empire has remained strikingly similar over 
the past 150 years, its landmarks remarkably little changed by the winds of 
words, we were bestowing on the world the gift of American law and the American way. . . 
The second motivation was to increase American wealth and power ... Hence America's 
internationalist crusade after 1945 was in part intended to establish throughout as much of 
the world as possible, a stable legal, political and economic order in which American com-
merce would flow freely and American military power would reign supreme. Both these sets 
of motives could be described as 'imperialist."' However, "As European integration pro-
gressed and as the Soviet fall from world power turned into utter collapse, the 'international 
community' became more discontent[ ed] with American power. It came to see international 
law as a vehicle for restraining the 'hyperpower,' and it became increasingly less tolerant of 
American 'exceptionalism. '" 
36 MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRJ, EMPIRE 182 (Harv. Univ. Press) (2002) ("The U.S. 
Constitution, as Jefferson said, is the one best calibrated for extensive Empire. We should 
emphasize once again that this Constitution is imperial and not imperialist. It is imperial 
because (in contrast to imperialism's project always to spread its power linearly in closed 
spaces and invade, destroy, and subsume subject countries within its sovereignty) the U.S. 
constitutional project is constructed on the model of rearticulating an open space and rein-
venting incessantly diverse and singular relations in networks across an unbounded terrain."). 
37 See generally John Fabian Witt, Book Review: Anglo-American Empire and the Crisis 
of the Legal Frame (Will the Real British Empire Please Stand Up?), 120 HARV. L. REV. 754 
(2007). 
38 Id. at 754--55. 
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time. Like their nineteenth-century British predecessors, American consti-
tutionalists now debate the allocation of foreign affairs powers between 
the legislative and executive branches. They debate the extent to which 
such allocations of power are susceptible to judicial review. They debate 
the merits of emergency exceptions to constitutional systems.39 
97 
However, within these debates, the claim of a unilateral executive 
seemed more unique to the United States., due to differences in the constitu-
tional cultures of the two empires. These differences led to a more polarized 
ideological debate.40 Within that context, the desire reposed in law to con-
strain power took on an ideological cast.41 
Witt notes, however, that imperial law was always "indeterminate 
and ambiguous," with one commentator suggesting that its ambivalences 
"stemmed from a deep tension in British imperial practice 'between the rule 
of law and the expansion of rule. "'42 The former, properly understood, 
would not be subject to ideological instrumentality, but would operate as an 
ideal, or rational, opposition to war as such. Witt, following R.W. Kostal, 
expresses it thus: 
[T]he legal frame in nineteenth-century Britain was not so much a set of 
substantive answers to the questions raised by empire as it was a forum in 
which debate about empire took place. The law functioned not as a body 
of rules or commands, but rather as a stock of discursive moves available 
to the contending parties in the debate over empire. Law created the lin-
guistic field on which the differing sides debated the Empire.43 
Witt adds a caveat: "Yet for all their agreement, for all their shared premis-
es, it was not always clear that the legal frame could give meaningful shape 
to their arguments."44 Sometimes, indeed, "law talk"45 failed to permit the 
39 Id. at 756-57. 
40 Id. at 757 ("There is at least one critical difference between the constitutionalisms of the 
twenty-first and nineteenth centuries: the culture of American foreign affairs constitutional-
ism is radically more polarized than the constitutionalism of the nineteenth-century British 
Empire; it includes claims of unilateral executive authority, on one hand, and judicially en-
forceable individual constitutional rights, on the other. Its British predecessor, by contrast, 
rejected both executive unilateralism and judicially enforceable constitutional rights in favor 
of a model that placed virtually all questions in the hands of Parliament."). 
41 See id. at 757. The political right, during the Bush years, supported the enhancement of 
the unilateral executive at the expense of the judges; the political left wished for more judi-
cial review to protect the individual liberties of the terrorism detainees. 
42 id. at 767 (quoting DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830 I 0 (Thomas 
A. Green, Hendrik Hartog, & Daniel Ersnt. eds. Univ. of North Carolina Press) (2005). 
43 id. at 791 . See also R.W. KOSTAL, A JURISPRUDENCE OF POWER: VICTORIAN EMPIRE AND 
THE RULE OF LAW (Oxford Univ. Press) (2005). 
44 Witt, supra note 37, at 791. 
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means for parties to connect with each other at all, and debate over the law 
of empire "began to spill over into political and ideological [arguments]."46 
The clear picture that emerges from Witt's analysis of the law of 
empire is of its historical contingency and its "constraint" to the imperatives 
of empire/expansion. However, Witt wants to recuperate an ideal of law as 
rational discourse in relation to the irrationality and violence of war-
notwithstanding war as the "construct" of law. Thus, he writes that, "How-
ever muddled and messy, however indeterminate and awkward, the legal 
frame's modest virtue is its historical association with relatively less repres-
sive forms of global power."47 Following Kostal, he notes also that, "the 
persistence of the legal frame in the British Empire helped to constrain em-
pire's excesses, even in places like [the 1865 revolt in the Jamaican town 
of] Morant Bay.'..i8 
This expresses law's historical contingency, but also speaks to a 
popular conception of law, one that severs law "as such" from the political 
process, and reposes in law the capacity to express the moral values of a 
community. Indeed, the "legal imagination" represented by legal discourse 
"produces a particular form of community. The choice to engage in law talk 
is the choice to engage in a kind of discourse with its own internal morali-
ty-a morality that rests on reason and that entails the dignity of the indi-
viduals who make claims on it."49 Witt's emphasis, by repetition, of the 
word "choice" presupposes a departure from force as the expression of in-
stinctual desire, a suppression of the force of desire as such. 
Daniel Williams, however, critiques this Rationalist or Enlighten-
ment view of law as repository of the rational discourse of a centered self, 
which Witt wishes to reclaim in the midst of the fraught and polarized con-
temporary debate. Again within the context of America's "imperialist" am-
bitions pursuant to its "war on terror," Williams posits law as coextensive 
with, rather than extrinsic to, the violence of war. 50 Williams suggests that 
the line is thin between law's construction of war as limited to "lex specia-
lis," on the one hand, and on the other a rationalistic law of empire internal-
ly conflicted between the desire for unlimited expansion and the desire for 
self-restraint. 51 Williams locates the source of both within what he terms the 
45 Id. at 783 ("The deep penetration of law talk into the debates on the Morant Bay affair 
made law, in Kostal's words, the 'forum for negotiation of the basic terms of political power' 
in the Jamaica debate.") (quoting R.W. KOSTAL, supra note 43, at 464). 
46 Id. at 791. 
47 Id. at 796. 
48 Id. at 796-97. 
49 Id. at 784. 
50 See generally Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold Rush- Part I: Hamdi, 9/I I, and the 
Dark Side of the Enlightenment, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 341 (2007). 
s1 Id. 
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"dark side"52 of the Enlightenment tradition. The distinction is manifest in 
the deference, in a substantive sense, of the judiciary to the political 
branches in the conduct of the "war on terror." 
For Williams, law is "nothing more than a facet of human striving," 
which itself is "more about desire and fantasy than it is about rationality."53 
Whence, the rationalism of law is already subject to the exigencies of de-
sire, indeed, it is a construct of desire.54 When, therefore, desire itself is 
construed according to imperial imperatives (the "rule of expansion," in 
Witt's phrase),55 then legal constraints, such as in the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
judgment,56 that required the executive to defer to Congress, are no more 
than a further suppression of law (in the sense of constraint, expressed as 
the authority of the judiciary over the political branches) in relation to poli-
tics. After Hamdi, the executive sought from Congress passage of the 2006 
Military Commissions Act (MCA).57 Williams describes this Act as an "ex-
pansion of sovereignty through legislative manufacturing of a rights regime 
outside the established framework of the Constitution," and "a process of 
legality that manufactures 'law' to suit the state's global ambitions."58 
Williams' view of law as the "legality" that characterizes and legi-
timates the "war on terror" is essentially unconstrained by law as "reason," 
and conforms to the "law-as-war" model, whereby even Witt's (rational) 
space for legal discourse is so captured by the war paradigm that law and 
war are indistinguishable.59 Williams takes Berman's argument to an ex-
treme: with the instauration of a war paradigm to adjudicate what might 
otherwise be criminal acts (i.e., acts of terror), the "law" or justice model is 
co-opted and ceases to function outside of the war framework or, put other-
52 Id. 
53 Id at 344. 
54 Id. ("The war against terrorism, when rhetorically decoded, is packaged as a fight 
against the dark side, a fight to preserve our Enlightenment heritage by averting the onset of 
a new dark age."). 
55 Witt, supra note 37, at 767. 
56 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
57 Kate Zemike, Senate Approves Broad New Rules to Try Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
28, 2006, at A I. 
58 Williams, supra note 50, at 351- 52 (The "legality" in question is what he describes as 
"process jurisprudence.") ("This fearsome sort of legality is largely shielded from our view 
(that is, from the view of Americans-the ones wielding this legality) with the veil of democ-
racy, knitted together with the thread of process jurisprudence."). 
59 Id at 385 (discussing how "necessity" produces law) ("The birth of the War on Terror 
thus came in the form of law. It is in this sense that necessity is not outside of law, or sus-
pends law, but instead creates the conditions for a new legal regime to bloom through the 
acts of the sovereign. Necessity is the soil for the seeds of law to take root. Necessity does 
not exempt. It produces."). 
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wise, outside of war-thought.60 The Supreme Court's post-9/11 jurispru-
dence has developed merely to ratify this view.61 
Another critique of the law of empire and the metaphor of war from 
James Forman62 also struggles with the parameters of law as expansion or as 
constraint, and like Williams, comes to settle upon the view that "law is 
war" under the hegemony of the Bush doctrine and the judicial acquies-
cence therein. Forman's view is from the perspective of domestic law, ra-
ther than from the view of international law. Like Witt, Forman writes from 
the internal perspective of law's Enlightenment promise as vehicle of ratio-
nality and repository of equality and justice. But like Williams, Forman 
seems less sanguine than Witt about the potential for law to live up to this 
promise. Rather than the popular conception of the war on terror as excep-
tional, as a "sharp break from the past, with American values and ideals 
'betrayed,' American law 'remade,"' the truth "is more complicated."63 In-
stead, Forman argues, "the war on terror is an extension- sometimes a gro-
tesque one--ofwbat we do in the name of the war on crime."64 
Forman's article is devoted to charting the various strategies and at-
titudes, particularly one of complacency, of an American public toward the 
most punitive aspects of the domestic "war on crime." In essence, "We have 
come to accept. .. excesses as casualties of war-whether on crime, drugs, 
or terror."65 And these excesses, which have become normative domestical-
ly, are exported as unexceptionable in the war on terror. 
Furthermore, Forman cautions that to conceive of domestic law as 
the bearer of virtue, as the norm in relation to an "aberrant" legal system in 
Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib, is to elide the extent to which the latter is 
in fact the norm within domestic law.66 "It lets some people-We the 
60 Williams, supra note 50 (following Giorgio Agamben in arguing that the war paradigm 
is a "state of exception" that "suspends" the criminal process and creates an alternative "le-
gality," a "law of detention" at the behest of the sovereign) ("[O}ur so-called war on terror is 
'transformed into a reality indefinitely extended into the future, control1ing not only the lives 
of prisoners and the fate of constitutional and international law, but also the very ways in 
which the future may or may not be thought" (quoting Jumrn BUTLER, PRECARJOUS LIFE: 
THE POWER OF MOURNING AND VIOLENCE 54 (Verso) (2004)). 
61 Id. 
62 See generally James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped 
Make the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE331 (2009). 
63 Id. at 332. 
64 Id. at 332- 33. 
65 Id. at 333. 
66 Id. at 337- 38 ("America suffers no lack of enthusiasm for the greatness of its legal 
system. Instead, our failure is to see our flaws. Convinced that our system is the most rights-
protective in the world, we are insufficiently self-reflective. For the same reasons, we are 
often highly suspicious of comparative or international reform models. These tendencies 
have stunted the development of our criminal justice system. Worse, they have left us in the 
unenviable position of having one of the most punitive systems in the world while believing 
we have one of the most liberal." And further on, Williams notes: "My discomfort comes 
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People--off the hook."67 As such, Forman's aim is in "exploring continui-
ties in places where the prevailing wisdom has been to emphasize disconti-
nuity. I [Forman] want to understand why we as a nation have allowed cer-
tain things to go on in our name, even, in some cases, after we learned the 
truth about abuses in the war on terror."68 
In short, Forman's argument is that an increasingly normative ap-
proach to criminal justice as harsh has formed the backdrop to "America's 
punitive approach to fighting the war on terror."69 The law's role in this is 
central, one key element being to limit the role of the judiciary in relation to 
the political branches.70 Another is to undermine the role of defense counsel 
in the war on terror. He writes: "Lawyers representing those locked up in 
the war on terror have been accused of waging 'lawfare': 'the growing use 
of international law claims, usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool 
of war .. . to gain a moral advantage over your enemy in the court of world 
opinion. "'71 
"Lawfare" is used here in the sense of a continuity between war and 
law, whereby "law" is fully captured by war. Jettisoned is the idea of law as 
the repository of value, reason, or truth. That is, lawfare is a distortion of 
law itself within the "metaphor"72 of war and its aims. Implicit here, as in 
Williams, is the "promise" of law as more than its punitive manifestation 
within the war paradigm. Implicit is the desire for law to function as a con-
straint upon power. As such, Forman's critique of the law as merely instru-
mental to war is basically reformist: the only way to change the operation of 
law-as-war is to fully apprehend and appreciate law's reduction at home to 
an instrument wielded, not by an overreaching executive, but by the public 
at large in its acceptance of- and sometimes its call for-a law of crime 
model that posits the war "metaphor" as paradigmatic of justice. 
Ultimately, Forman's call, like Williams' and Witt's, is for a return 
of law to a lost, prelapsarian state of grace, when law was inclusive (Witt's 
from the fact that in contrasting the aberrant (Guantanamo) with the normal (our domestic 
criminal justice system) we become blinded to the profound abnormality of our domestic 
criminal system. One of my goals in this Article is to counter this tendency by raising ques-
tions about our domestic criminal system by turning a mirror back on it."). 
67 Id. at 338. 
68 Id. at 339-40. 
69 Id. at 347. 
70 Id. at 361 ("As these examples make clear, in the war on crime the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches moved jointly to expand their own authority at the expense of the judi-
ciary."); See also Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109- 366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(2006). 
71 Id. at 363 (quoting David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 
2007, at Al I). 
72 Id. at 373 (''Throughout this article, I have attempted to show how, in some important 
ways, 9/l I did not change everything .. . There is one final analogy that is worth our consid-
eration, one which might help explain all the others. It concerns th.every metaphor of war."). 
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191h century metropolitan "law talk"); when law was rational (Williams on 
the call to law's Enlightenment heritage); when law was just (Forman's call 
to a robust judiciary constraining the worst instincts of a populace enervated 
by its "war on crime"). In each case, law represents a rationalist desire for 
self-restraint in tension with the drive toward untrammeled and expansive 
power. 
Each of these critiques of the law of empire, and the war model it 
appears to project, implicates a sense of law as broader than the war para-
digm and the law's constitutive function. But the breadth is confined to the 
parameters of law discourse sensu stricto: law's promise, law's justice, even 
law's grace. In an almost theological tum, the discourse on law and war 
seems to follow from an originary and traumatic loss. But what lies behind 
these laments is an even more complicated elision: of law as always and 
already incomplete, contingent, impure. These authors therefore index how 
much the law of empire depends upon a binarity, which in tum constrains 
the juridical category, or juridical thought, in its capacity to think relational-
ly, or to think in other than juridically bounded terms (law is a "contained 
entity," in the positivist sense).73 As such, within the paradigm of war, law 
moves from contingency to formality. 
I shall return to the theme of "relational'' thought in Part IV of this 
Article. Here, however, in this brief review of what is a broad and multifa-
ceted debate, I have suggested that these historically situated views reduce 
to two potential roles for law: either as part of the war mechanism or "dis-
course," or as separate from it. The perspective that comes through is of a 
very limited role for law, on the one hand, in light of the expanded political 
authority to extend American power globally (through its wars), and on the 
other, an expansive instrumentality of law (or "legality") to justify those 
political and ideological ambitions. In the result, law "as" war, as well as 
law "and" war, represent conflicting desires-and different forms of ex-
pressing them-on a continuum within the imperial war imaginary. The 
discursive opposition is between law as positing the desire for self-restraint, 
and law as legitimating the desire for expansion (the law-as-war model). 
In the following analysis, I wish to explore the implications of 
thinking about lawfare as expressive of this bounded view of law inherent to 
the above critical perspectives that circulated around the time of lawfare's 
coinage, as well as expressive of a relational view beyond its historical 
sources. As noted, Dunlap's conception of lawfare enters the frame as both 
an instance of the instrumentalization of the unstable border between war 
73 See, e.g., Mirza, supra, note 9, at 618 ("The law is not a contained entity, as described 
in positivist accounts, but is in a condition of 'perpetual hyphenation,' as indicated by Fou-
cault's coinage of terms: 'politico-juridical,' 'epistemologico-juridical,' 'scientifico-legal,' 
and 'juridico-anthropological. "'). 
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and not war.74 I examine Dunlap's 2001 essay on lawfare, coming as it does 
directly in the wake of 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan. 75 I then look at 
Dunlap's 2009 "refined"76 definition. It is in the latter that a more relational 
critique of law comes to view, not through the specific definitional criteria 
Dunlap outlines, but within the textual figures and rhetorical significations. 
I suggest, then, that lawfare, as a border concept, looks backwards to law as 
a "contained entity," i.e., law's ineluctable nexus with war as tending to-
ward a "war paradigm," and forwards to law as a relational concept, sensi-
tive to "influences from things which are other to it, and ever-absorbing 
these in its 'vacuity. ,,,n 
III. LA WFARE AS BORDER CONCEPT: EVOLVING MEANINGS AND 
SIGNIFICATIONS 
In this Part, I will chart Dunlap's changes in the definition of "law-
fare" between 2001 and 2009. I suggest that in the first definition, "lawfare" 
seems to represent not only the "bounded" view of law, but the law's radical 
delimitation to purely formal instrument of the military aims contemporary 
with the term's inauguration. In Dunlap's later definition, the term opens 
itself up to an alternative, more contingent perspective, which in tum inti-
mates an extrajuridical critique of law within the confines of the law of em-
pire as the law of war. 
A. Law/are in 2001 
Dunlap delineates law, in relation to lawfare, according to three cri-
teria of analysis: as adherence, as strategy, and as valuation. In each, Dun-
lap's earlier definition of "lawfare" is essentially in the negative, a caution 
against the limitative or constraining influence of law in war. Dunlap is crit-
ical of those commentators who call for more, rather than less, law. He ar-
gues that adherence, particularly to the international laws of war, could limit 
the military in its attempt to achieve its aims.78 Embedded in his formulation 
of lawfare is the view that law bears society's values and aspirations. As 
such, in times of crisis, the "value" in security and survival trump any rights 
and liberties a society might value under a "different" model of law. Dunlap 
fully embraces the war paradigm, and "lawfare" represents that embrace. 
Dunlap begins his article with the following questions: 
Is lawfare turning warfare into unfair? In other words, is international law 
undercutting the ability of the U.S. to conduct effective military interven-
74 Dunlap, supra note I, at 60 & 70. 
75 Id 
76 Dunlap, supra note 3, at 35. 
77 Mirza, supra note 9, at 618. 
78 See Dunlap, supra note 1. 
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tions? ls it becoming a vehicle to exploit American values in ways that ac-
tually increase risks to civilians? In short, is law becoming more of the 
problem in modern war instead of part of the solution? 79 
A central concern is with adherence to law to the extent that it does 
not interfere with the war aims. These aims are furthered by new, technolo-
gical methods of warfare- particularly aerial war methods. Dunlap cautions 
against adherence to the laws of war, or the "laws of armed conflict" 
(LOAC), when these conflict with the U.S.'s war aims.80 
This theme is carried through in Dunlap's discussion of internation-
al law as such. Pursuant to the theme of law as repository of value, he notes 
that LOAC necessarily expresses an abstract, universal value that may be 
unconnected to the values of a specific culture or national entity.81 He un-
derlines this point by noting how much closer LOAC is to European values 
than it is to American ones: a case in point is the different valuation Euro-
peans place in their armed forces compared with Americans' attitude toward 
the same.82 Thus, both as bearer of value and as limited to furthering the 
war's aims, lawfare reduces law to the legitimation of war aims: law "as" 
war. 
A second salient emphasis in the article is the definition of "law-
fare" to reference the strategy of the enemy. Hence, "lawfare" "describes a 
method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military ob-
jective. "83 In the hands of the enemy, this means that, "Though at first blush 
one might assume lawfare would result in less suffering in war (and some-
times it does), in practice it too often produces behaviors that jeopardize the 
protection of the truly innocent. "84 This is because lawfare, as a weapon of 
war, is designed to "make it appear that the U.S. is waging war in violation 
of the letter or spirit of LOAC." 85 As noted above, Dunlap defends the 
79 Id. at 1. 
80 See id. at 15 ("When interpretations of LOAC look as if they are disconnected to huma-
nitarian values, support for the law inevitably wanes."). 
81 Id. at 17 (discussing universal versus particular values). 
82 Id. ("Despite the existence of an all-volunteer force, Americans in and out of uniform 
generally do not consider those who serve as anything other than citizens of equal or more 
value as any enemy combatant or noncombatant. Europeans, however, have a history of 
populating heir militaries with long-term professionals and legions of hired foreigners. This 
seems to create a certain sense that the armed forces are more tools of the state than citizenry 
in uniform. To me, this produces a collective societal ethic that gives the impression that 
military personnel are expendable assets." Dunlap makes the point that because of these 
differences, LOAC does not represent "universal" values.). 
83 Id. at 4. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. (noting that lawfare is described as "increasingly foes of the United States see this 
development [i.e. the instant news cycle and imagery overwhelming a government's capacity 
to explain itself] as a vulnerability to be exploited. No longer able to seriously confront- let 
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commander's non-adherence to LOAC to the extent that international law 
does not conform to U.S. values. In the result, "lawfare" indexes a highly 
skeptical attitude between law and war, one that reduces the former to the 
latter. 
The instrumental emphasis of law is furthered in Dunlap's defini-
tion of "lawfare" as a "technique"86 deployed by the United States and her 
allies. Lawfare lends moral and legal "cover" to the commander in the 
field. 87 Thus, to diminish the effectiveness of lawfare strategies of the ene-
my, Dunlap proposes a form of law as pervasive but seamless with the war 
aim. Citing to the U.S.'s obligation, pursuant to Operation Enduring Free-
dom, to "engage in extensive negotiations and diplomatic strategies to ob-
tain legal rights for the basing and overflight of military aircraft" and the 
resulting "threat that lawfare will make obtaining like commitments even 
more troublesome in the future," Dunlap proposes more "permanent solu-
tions" to the problem of lawfare. 88 "In my view one of these could be a 
greater militarization-indeed weaponization--of space."89 
Dunlap's development of lawfare cautions against adherence to law 
if this should ''judicialize" the war effort. 90 In the wake of 9/11, popular 
sentiment seemed to support a robust executive with virtually unlimited 
powers.91 Compliance with the rule of law, at this early stage in what was 
alone defeat- America militarily, they resort to a strategy that can be labeled 'lawfare'.") 
(italics in original). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 6 ("Michael lgnatieff, who has written extensively about the role of law and law-
yers in the Balkan conflict, provides real insight into the thinking of many senior officials. 
He maintains: '[Lawyers] provide harried decision-makers with a critical guarantee of legal 
coverage, turning complex issues of morality into technical issues of legality, so that whatev-
er moral or operational doubts a commander may have, he can at least be sure he will not 
face legal consequences.' In short, the predominance of law and lawyers in U.S. military 
interventions is as much a concession to the verities of modem war as it is an altruistic com-
mitment to human rights," (citing to MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR (Metropolitan 
· Books 2000) at 199.). 
88 Id. at 16. 
89 Id ("Among other things, orbiting armed space systems would obviate the need for 
foreign basing or overflight permissions. This would provide the U.S. with greater flexibility 
for unilateral military intervention if required. Of course, the weaponization of space will 
produce a host of legal and policy issues."). 
90 Id. at 19. 
91 Id. at 18 ("Americans are much more concerned about finding and stopping the perpe-
trators of violence than they are about the niceties of international law . .. Stewart Baker, the 
former general counsel of the National Security Agency, concludes '[w]e have judicialized 
more aspects of human behavior than any civilization in history, and we may have come to 
the limit of that.' Consequently, in security matters contemporary American discourse is 
pervaded by the notion that '[t]he time for legal maneuverings, extraditions and trials is 
past."' (citing Charles Krauthamrner, To War, Not Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at 29 
("An open act of war demands a military response, not a judicial one") and John Lancaster 
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named a "war on terror," was to be purely strategic. For instance, if the 
enemy is using legal means in an asymmetrical war, how can we fight back? 
The answer was: adherence to LOAC to the extent that it reflects "our" val-
ues, and to the extent that it pragmatically supports the aims of war, as in-
terpreted by the political branch.92 Dunlap expresses support for the "vastly 
greater powers" arrogated to the executive by the legislature "at the expense 
of what heretofore were accepted individual rights."93 
A couple of observations can be made concerning the development 
of lawfare. Unlike Forman and the other critics of the "law of empire" as 
being continuous with the war paradigm, Dunlap embraces this continuity, 
"law as war," as necessary in a time of war. Law must not only be reduced 
to its formal element but, even then, be dispensed with if it does not serve 
the aim of the commander: "[T]his paper is intended as a reminder that 
those interested in promoting law as an ameliorator of the misery of war are 
obliged to ensure it does not become bogged down with interpretations that 
are at odds with legitimate military concems."94 Whence, "LOAC must re-
main receptive to new developments, especially technological ones that can 
save lives-even if that means breaking old paradigrns."95 The paradigm in 
question is the already-attenuated delimitation of law in relation to imperial 
power and its wars of expansion. 
The 2001 essay that inaugurated the term "lawfare" was thus not 
only on all fours with the Bush Doctrine96-and, as commentators subse-
quently noted, was widely adopted by officials within the administration.97 
It also seemed to insist upon a moral element to the reduction of law to mili-
tarized instrument, albeit within the context of "war," which itself depended 
upon a successful instrumentalization of the destabilized border between 
war and not war. It is this element, this valuative "center of gravity," as 
Dunlap characterizes it in the subsequent essay,98 which indexes an interest-
and Susan Schmidt, US Rethinks Strategy for Coping with Terrorists, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 
2001, at 9.)). 
92 Id. at 19. 
93 Id. at 18. 
94 Id. at 20. 
95 Id. 
96 For a discussion on The Bush Doctrine, see Charlie Gibson's Gaffe, THE WASH. POST, 
Sept. 13, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/ 
09/12/ AR200809 I 202457 .html/. 
97 See, e.g., David Luban, Law/are and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1981, 2021 (2008) ("Jack Goldsmith's recent memoir of his service in the Bush administra-
tion confirms that the administration accepts the lawfare theory."); See also, Major General 
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. & Major Linell A. Letendre, Military Lawyering and Professional 
Independence in the War on Terror: A Response to David Luban, 61 STAN. L . REV. 417 
(2008); see also, Michael P . Scharf, International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT'L L. 321 (2009). 
98 See Dunlap, supra note I. 
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ing albeit counterintuitive dimension to lawfare as border concept. The radi-
cal reduction of law to pure strategic valuation registers law's inherent va-
cuity. As such, lawfare exposes its conception of law to an extra-legal "cri-
tique," so to speak. For the practical consequences of lawfare as wea-
pon/strategy of war and as strategic adherence (instrumentalization) to the 
laws of war have one consequence: the demolishment of value, i.e., the de-
valuation of the other as value. 
In this early essay, Dunlap defines "lawfare" as a "legal" strategy to 
stabilize one paradigm (war) at the expense of another.99 The latter, if any-
thing, is cast as a source of weakness and vulnerability. In the result, the 
first essay presents an interpretation of lawfare specific to its historical con-
text in two senses. First, it captures the moment of widespread disaffection 
with law. The failure of international law to "save" us from 9/11 led to a 
sense of impatience with international law and multilateralism, whereupon 
the decisive, unilateral, even "imperial" action, captured by the rubric of 
war, became attractive and resurgent. Lawfare expresses, indeed ratifies, 
that sense, suggesting the pure instrumentality and subservience of law to 
war. 
As a consequence, lawfare's meaning and signification suppress 
elements of the wider and ongoing debate and historical critique around the 
manifestation of American power in a unipolar world: for example, the 
fraught relationship between law and the wars of the new empire. In the 
second sense, "lawfare" intimates, albeit by negation, the law as bearer of 
value, humanitarian and otherwise; it invokes the "law-and-war" model of 
constraint, but only as an alternative to be rejected. In this second significa-
tion, law bears "value," but this value inheres in the aims of war itself-
pursuant to the war paradigm. 
In Dunlap's subsequent definition of "lawfare" in 2009, he contin-
ues the three elements or significations of the term: adherence, strategy, and 
valuation. '00 But the temporal distance from the events of 9/11 have engen-
dered some "refinements" in the meaning of "lawfare." 101 As I will argue in 
the following section, although the meaning remains "bounded," its rhetori-
cal figuration is more contingent. This indexes the competing societal de-
sires reposed within the law as it relates to war, and lawfare is opened up to 
an alternative critique. 
B. Lawfare in 2009 
In 2009, Dunlap updated his definition of the term "lawfare" in part 
to respond to comments and critiques after the first article received wide 
99 Id. 
100 Dunlap, supra note 3, at 35. 
101 Id. at 35. 
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circulation and attention. As noted in the previous section, his earlier defini-
tion went as follows: "[Lawfare is] the use of law as a weapon of war" and, 
more specifically, "a method of warfare where law is used as a means of 
realizing a military objective."102 Today, he writes in the new article, "[T]he 
most refined definition [of "lawfare"] is 'the strategy of using--or misus-
ing-law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an opera-
. 1 b' . ,,,103 t1ona o ~ective. 
Dunlap seems to be concerned with the transformative, i.e., valua-
tive, aspects of war and of law in his formulation of lawfare. He asks: 
"While recognizing the ever-present ethical responsibility to comply with 
the law, how does transforming adherence to law into a strategy serve the 
purposes of the warfighter?" 104 His answer: we should have more, rather 
than less, "lawfare."105 Hence, lawfare represents in the first instance this 
desire to transform adherence to law into law as a military strategy as such. 
Citing to Victor Davis Hanson, Dunlap notes that "the basis for the enorm-
ous success of Western militaries is their adherence to constitutional gov-
ernment and respect for individual freedoms, and constant external audit 
and oversight of their strategy and tactics .. . In short, adherence to the rule 
of law does not present the military disadvantage so many assume." 106 
Dunlap invokes von Clausewitz107 at three points within the text. 
The first instance recalls von Clausewitz's well-known definition of war 
and relates it to lawfare: "Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is a 'contin-
uation of political intercourse, carried on with other means' relates directly 
to the theoretical basis of lawfare. "'108 This allows Dunlap to emphasize the 
importance of the apparent or "perceptual" adherence to law. The second 
mention of von Clausewitz comes shortly after the first, in a quotation from 
William Eckhardt as follows: 
Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands com-
pliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as illegal 
and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the law of 
102 Dunlap, supra note I, at 2. 
'°
3 The earlier definition is cited to: Dunlap, Law/are Today, YALE J . lNT'L AFF. ·(Winter 
2008), at 146. 
l!l4 Dunlap, supra note 3, at 35. 
105 Id. at 35- 37 ("media events" to achieve military aims (Abu Ghraib, the detainee abuse 
case, is a primary vehicle for the launching of a thousand "lawfare campaign[s]"; legal 
process, such as contracts, lawsuits, and the "use [of] courts"; international "sanctions and 
other legal methodologies," at 35; and "operational verification"). 
106 Id. at 37. 
107 Carl von Clausewitz was an I 81h Century Gennan military theorist who stressed moral 
and political aspects of war. 
!OS Dunlap, supra note 3, at 35 (citing CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (Michael Howard 
and Peter Pare!, eds. and trans., Princeton University Press, 1989)). 
2010] A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS 
war. Our vulnerability here is what philosopher of war Carl von Clause-
witz would term our "center of gravity. 109 
109 
The third mention of von Clausewitz comes further on in the text. In 
a discussion of the Palestine-Israel conflict as reported in a German paper, 
Dunlap writes: "Interestingly, Der Spiegel characterized the expected legal 
action in what are in effect lawfare terms in paraphrased Clausewitzian lan-
guage as a 'continuation of the war with legal means."' 110 
All these, of course, speak to the use of, and adherence to, law as 
instrumental to war: as weapon, strategy, and substitution. But the concep-
tion of law as a "center of gravity" is interesting for what it harbors, implies, 
and irradiates. At the end of the article, Dunlap writes: 
While it is true, as Professor Eckhardt maintains, that adherence to the rule 
of law is a "center of gravity" for democratic societies such as ours- and 
certainly there are those who will try to turn that virtue into a vulnerabili-
ty- we still can never forget that it is also a vital source of our great 
h . 111 strengt as a nation. 
The image of law as a center of gravity is both spatial-suggesting 
a c·entripetal pull of law- and temporal, referring to the mores and values of 
the society as a whole. It can be compared with other spatio-temporal im-
ages within the text, specifically the law and the war as separate "spaces" 
that must be overlaid and infused together, ensuring the sublimation of the 
individual will to the command of the general. The pull of the center (law) 
ensures that the command is a representation of "our values," the source of 
"our great strength." Thus, when the space of war becomes a "law-space," 
as in the following, something more than the instrumentality of law to war 
seems to be at stake. Quoting Richard Schragger, Dunlap writes: "'Law 
makes just wars possible by creating a well-defined legal space within 
which individual soldiers can act without resorting to their own personal 
moral codes. "'112 
Dunlap elaborates on the space metaphor, suggesting a (centrifugal) 
spread of law from a "center" to the further reaches of the war front: "[T]he 
commander [must] be concerned with legal preparation of the battles-
109 Id. at 35 (citing William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws 
His Sword, 4 CHI. J. OF lNT'L L. 431 (2003)). 
110 Id. at 37 (citing Thomas Darnstadt & Christopher Schult, Did Israel Commit War 
Crimes in Gaza?, DER SPIEGEL, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/ 
world/O, 1518,603508,00.html). 
111 Id at 39 (citing William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws 
His Sword, 4 CHI. J. OF INT'L L. 431 (2003).). 
112 Id. at 38 (citing Richard C. Schragger, Cooler Heads: The Difference between the Pres-
ident's Lawyers and the Military's, SLATE.COM, Sept. 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2150050/?nav/navoa). 
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pace."113 This assures the troops of "the legal and moral validity of their 
actions," Dunlap adds. 114 Note here the transformative power with which 
Dunlap invests the law: from adherence as such to adherence as strategy, 
implicating a perceptual immanence of war within and through law. The 
collapse between law-space and war-space is characterized as an aesthetic 
project. 
In the result, all three modalities of law in relation to war pursuant 
to the meaning and function of lawfare-law as component (weapon) of 
war; law as adherence by the subject to the colllll)and; and law as a spatio-
temporal investment of the war-space with (moral) value-tend toward an 
formalization of law in relation to war. Whence, the more formalistic and 
aesthetic the category of law-as representing the value and legitimacy of 
power-the more persuasive would be adherence to law, and the deploy-
ment of law as military strategy, to justify the (military) exercise of power. 
But while this latter definition remains embedded within the war 
paradigm that defined the earlier meaning of "lawfare" (law is instrumental 
to war), it subtly, and by indirection, intimates the desire for law to project 
an alternative matrix, one of juridical constraint. It does this, paradoxically, 
by defining lawfare as the delegitimation of the "value" of the other. Thus, 
if in the first instance lawfare delegitimizes "value" as such, then in theory 
it critiques the command as a purely political act not subject to the law's 
review. That is, if law under the war paradigm has fully incorporated the 
aims of war and the voice of the commander as the vehicle of "my" value 
and "my" virtue, then lawfare implicitly critiques this-and thereby the war 
paradigm within which this view is inscribed-through its apophatic 115 con-
ceptualization of law as an instrument of de-valuation, or negation, as such. 
This, at least, is the theory, i.e., that lawfare by a kind of negative 
imaging of law as value represents an alternative to the determinate view of 
law in relation to war. What is proposed here is not that Dunlap sets out to 
claim a distinction from the "necessity" of law's suppression within war-
Dunlap makes a much clearer statement along those lines in the first defini-
tion. Rather, an analysis of the rhetoric within which he "refines" his defini-
tion suggests that law, reduced to an aesthetic - or, in theological terms, an 
apophatic----category, registers its central valuative vacuity. As the critiques 
in the previous section (Part II) indicated, this delivers law to strategic in-
strumentalization by all parties for their own advantage. Lawfare is one 
such instance, deploying law as a weapon of war and an "instrument" of 
strategic adherence. But it also intimates an interruption to what seems an 
113 Id. at37. 
114 Id. at 38. 
115 Apophasis is a theological term, generally meaning a knowledge of God through nega-
tion (literally, an ''un-saying"). THE NEW WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN 
SPIRITUALITY 117 (Philip Sheldrake ed., 2005). 
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inevitable construction of war by law. By implication, lawfare interferes 
with the desire for unlimited expansion characteristic of the law of empire 
in its transcription as the law of war (war paradigm). In short, the aesthetici-
zation of law by war, so to speak, confirms the conception of lawfare as 
border concept and, thereby, the potential for relation beyond the bounded 
and fixed confines of law and/as war. 
What, however, does a "relational" concept of law involve, particu-
larly as this would seem to implicate an "outside" of law? Is there such a 
domain? In the final section, Part IV, I entertain a thought experiment, whe-
reby lawfare as a border concept is analogous to various threshold concepts 
in other domains, 116 such as theology and psychoanalysis. 117 In this way, I 
hope to show what lawfare, as a concept situated between law and war, as 
well as located outside of the discourse at the same time, might provoke in 
thinking about the parameters of the law/war matrix. I suggest such an expe-
riment is already implied by lawfare as linguistic desire in relation to the 
new phase of the old wars that gave birth to the term, and in relation to other 
wars and occupations that the term might reference in the future. 
IV. LA WF ARE AS PASSAGE CONCEPT (A BRIEF PSYCHOANALYTIC 
INTERPELLA TrON) 
Under the law-as-war paradigm, lawfare extends and enhances 
war's juridical and moral legitimacy as such through the use of law to ex-
tend or contract the boundary between war and not-war. Likewise, the in-
stauration of war-value as a "center of gravity" to lawfare-<leployment of 
law within, and as, war--extends or contracts the boundary between law 
and not-law. Both discursive movements, i.e., extensions and contractions, 
inhere in a determinate, or bounded, view of the interrelationship and en-
meshment between law and war. That is, law/war is, or is not, X, at a fixed 
point along a continuum, the border between them moving, like a chess 
piece, according to the success or failure of a strategic (and partisan) legal 
argument or military campaign. 
116 Domains not discussed in this article might include, for example, sociology and anthro-
pology. See, e.g., Scott Atran & Robert Axelrod, Why We Talk to Ter.rorists, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 2010 (The authors counter the legal presumption, per the recent U.S. Supreme Court 
holding in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010), that "any 'material 
support' of a foreign terrorist group, including talking to terrorists or the communication of 
expert knowledge and scientific information, helps lend 'legitimacy' to the organization." 
The authors suggest that whilst this must sometimes be true, "American law has to find a 
way to make a clear distinction between illegal material support and legal actions that in-
volve talking with terrorists privately in the hopes of reducing global terrorism and promot-
ing national security." The authors are from anthropology and political science, respectively). 
117 But see, e.g., Susan R. Schmeiser, Romancing the Family: Tribute to Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 327, 336 (2010) (cautioning against "the quest for a 
more exalted discipline for the study of law"). 
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In a sense, Dunlap's project, i.e., "lawfare," suggests the extension 
of the war paradigm through the dilation, rather than the contraction, of the 
use of law, both in response to the enemy's lawfare campaigns (attempts to 
delegitimize the U.S.'s war aims and conduct), and as an expansion and 
legitimation of the war aims as such. The question then becomes whether 
lawfare can be conceptualized to effectuate an opposite strategy, thought, or 
result. I have argued that an analysis of Dunlap's meaning and the significa-
tions of the term lawfare would suggest that yes: lawfare, unlike the tradi-
tional law/war topology from which as language it derives, indexes some-
thing beyond the confmes of that bounded discourse. I turn briefly, and by 
way of conclusion, to psychoanalysis, in an attempt to excavate that extra-
discursive and relational sense projected by the term "lawfare." 
Previously, I suggested that lawfare as a border concept enabled a 
view of its tertiary intimation, beyond "law" and "war" as a fixed, dyadic 
fatality. The metaphor I would suggest further, however, might be of law-
fare as a passage. This gets to the sense of its projection beyond merely in-
timating a "third way," and highlights its potential as an escape or terminus, 
a result different from the war paradigm to which law is captive--or, put 
otherwise, the law paradigm through which war is constitutive. It is as pas-
sage that lawfare might borrow by analogy from the insights of psychoana-
lysis. 
The irony, or paradox, is that the move from a bounded sense oflaw 
to a relational conception actually limits what law is. The bounded concep-
tion, with its signification of law at fixed points along a continuum, is cha-
racteristic of the expansive war paradigm as, according to Witt, the law of 
empire. 118 A relational jurisprudence, as suggested by a radical reading of 
law through the lens of theology or psychoanalysis, has already limited it-
self by "relating" to, i.e., by requiring the appearance of, the other. 
A relational theory does not deny the violence of law. 119 To the con-
trary, relationality accepts, as Gillian Rose puts it, that both self and other 
are "equally enraged and invested" in the moment of law's mediation of 
118 See also, HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 36, at 12 (by way of analogy, on war and empire, 
stating that "[t]he traditional concept of just war involves the banalization of war and the 
celebration of it as an ethical instrument, both of which were ideas that modem political 
thought and the international conununity of nation-states had resolutely refused. These two 
traditional characteristics have reappeared in our postmodern world: on the one hand, war is 
reduced to the status of police action, and on the other, the new power that can legitimately 
exercise ethical functions through war is sacralized."). 
119 See, e.g., SLAVOJ ZIZEK, VIOLENCE: Six SIDEWAYS REFLECTIONS 195 n.17 (Profile 
Books 2008) (referencing the German word gewa/t, meaning both 'authority' or 'established 
power;' and the English phrase 'to enforce the law,' "which suggests that it is impossible to 
think about the law without referring to a certain violence, both at the origin, when the law is 
first created, and repeatedly, when the law is 'applied'"). 
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desire. 120 The difference, then, between a determinate view and a relational 
view is one of recognition. We see law in relation to war more objectively, 
as a productive instrument, and so we can think law otherwise. 
Kathryn Tanner, a theologian, expresses a similar problem within 
Christian thought. Tanner notes that in traditional theology, "[H]uman con-
sciousness is the image of God all by itself, in an ideally self-enclosed self-
sufficiency-e.g., when the self is knowing, loving, or remembering only its 
own pure productions." Tanner then writes: "The alternative would be to 
consider human nature an essentially relational affair, indistinct apart from 
and clearly definable only in terms of its determination by what it is related 
to. Human beings would therefore become the image of God only in an ac-
tual relationship with God, bringing with it the only real correspondence 
with divine life and action to be found in human existence." 121 
Relational theory suggests an essential malleability of thought. In 
theology, this is apposite to an uncertainty of how one comes to "know" 
God, as expressed within the apophatic tradition. 122 If humans are made in 
His image, then the production of a self through the recognition of self as 
image of an incomprehensible other is already both a saying and an unsay-
ing, an in-determination of the self in relation to knowing the unknowable. 
But this comes about through relation, rather than solipsism. 123 Tanner sug-
gests this in the following terms: "[Humans] are the mirror of whatever it is 
upon which they gaze. They take their identities from the uses to which they 
12° Kathryn Tanner, In the Image of the Invisible, in APOPHATIC BODIES: NEGATIVE 
THEOLOGY, INCARNATION, AND RELAT!ONALITY 119 (Chris Boesel & Catherine Keller eds., 
2010). 
121 Id. at 119. 
122 See, e.g., Mary-Jane Rubenstein, Dionysius, Derrida, and the Critique of "Ontotheo/o-
gy," 24:4 MODERN THEOLOGY 725, 731 (Oct. 2008) (comparing apophaticism to deconstruc-
tion.). Although ultimately different, Rubenstein notes that central to both, and different then 
from the "kataphatic" tradition implied within ontotheology, is "the Dionysian God [as] 
triune [in a hierarchical sense]; that is, self-identical only by means of differentiation and 
relation." Furthermore, apropos of relationality, Dionysius' God "refuses to stand still like a 
good metaphysical lodestone; in fact, it defies the logic of rest and motion, intemality and 
externality. This is the reason the soul must abandon itself as a knowing self before it can be 
lifted to union with God." Id. at 728. The juxtaposition, then, is between relation as move-
ment, and certainty as stasis, whereupon the apophatic God "refuses to be conceptualized. 
Rather than securing knowledge, he disables it; rather than affirming human subjectivity, he 
dismantles it." Id. at 731. 
123 See, e.g., Veronique Voruz, 'That which in life might prefer death .... ': From the 
death drive to the desire of the analyst, in LAW AND EVIL: PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 273 (Ari Hirvonen & Janne Porttikivi eds., 2010). For Kant-as described 
by Jacques-Alain Miller- "the subject is speaking to himself, enunciating a law that terroriz-
es him." Id. Lacan looks to Sade for an explicit "distinction between subject and other." Id. 
In short, "(t]he Kantian subject may be free from objective causality, the scientific determin-
ism, but Lacan demonstrates that it is not free from the object-cause of the moral law that it 
gives itself." Id. 
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put themselves, like vessels that gain their character from whatever they are 
made to carry."124 
As previously noted, "lawfare" signifies law as a central valuative 
emptiness, a "center of gravity" as sheer strategy (law deployed as strategic 
adherence, as weapon, and as devaluation). 125 Although this conception 
endorses the war paradigm, it also functions as the basis of critique, since it 
is here that a methodology of relation might be articulated. Thus, the pro-
posal is for a theory of intersubjective exchange126 a process of subjectiva-
tion that takes account of situated experience. In the context of psychoana-
lysis, this involves the temporal and contingent "dialogue" between the ana-
lyst and the analysand at the level of desire-although not desire for each 
other. Lawfare as passage might, by analogy, involve a similar iteration at 
the level of valuation, with law as the medium of exchange. 
Veronique Voruz describes Jacques Lacan's development of an eth-
ics of the psychoanalytic practice. 127 Voruz notes that for psychoanalysis to 
work, it must be conceived as potentially coming to an end, i.e., it must be 
"terminable."128 For this to occur, the analyst must substitute and "incar-
nate" the object-cause of the analysand's (patient's) desire with the "expe-
rienced"129 or analyzed desire of the analyst. This process of incarnation, 
124 Tanner, supra note 120, at 123- 24. Tanner adds that,"'[h]uman nature adapts itself to 
the direction of thought and it changes according to whatever form it is inclined to by the 
impulse of free choice.' This means .. . that '[h]uman nature is in fact like a mirror, and it 
takes on different appearances according to the impressions of free will.' . . . Reflective 
capacities of self-judgment mean humans can try to reshape in a self-critical fashion even 
those desires they cannot help having by nature." Id. at 124 (quoting Gregory of Nyssa, 
Fourth Homily, in COMMENTARY ON THE SONG OF SONGS at 92 (Casimir McCambley trans. 
and intro., 1987)). .. 
125 Dunlap, supra note 3, at 35. 
126 See, e.g., Grant Kester, Work.shop Notes from the Monongahela Conference on Post-
industrial Community Development, Carnegie Mellon University (Oct. 23- 25, 2003), 
http://moncon.greenmuseum.org/papers/kester.pdf (last visited August 28, 2010) (opposing 
the hermeneutic tradition's "arid proceduralism that exiles the physical, somatic, and non-
verbal components of collaboration" with "the vulnerability of intersubjective exchange" as 
the basis for a concrete "dialogic interaction," within the context (for Kessler) of the collabo-
ration between artist and co-participants within collaborative projects). 
127 See Voruz, supra note 123. 
128 Voruz, supra note 123, at 275. After reduction of multiple to "fundamental" fantasy, 
"The analyst can then incarnate the object-cause of the analysand's desire, a desire which 
like all desires is stmctura/Jy perverse, and so expose the jouissance of the analysand: by 
incarnating the object-cause of the analysand's desire, and not of his or her fantasy, the ana-
lyst incarnates castration in order to separate the analysand from his or her deleterious, mor-
tifying jouissance. (Castration of course is to be understood as a limit to jouissance.)" (italics 
in original) (internal citations omitted). Id. 
129 THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK VII, THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, 1959-
1960 300 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Dennis Porter trans., Routledge, 1992) in Id. at 260. The 
full quotation from Lacan comes at the beginning ofVoruz' essay as an epigraph: "What the 
analyst has to give, unlike the partner in the act of love, is something that even the most 
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with theological echoes (i .e., the body of Christ), creates the condition for 
the "castration" 130 or limitation of the analysand's "jouissance."131 The lan-
guage is technical, 132 but it points to a basic problem of how the analysand 
is to live with her "symptom," the thing about her that makes her who she 
is, that shows itself repeatedly as marking her as "this" rather than "that" 
person. As Jacques-Alain Miller puts it, "A person's symptom is his or her 
true identity." He continues: "Lacan said that the symptom of certain per-
sons could be the most real thing they possess. This illuminates for us how 
the symptom is associated with the real."133 
beautiful bride in the world cannot outmatch, that is, to say, what he has. And what he has is 
nothing other than his desire, like that of the analysand, with the difference that it is an expe-
rienced desire." Id. 
130 Voruz, supra note 123, at 275. After reduction of multiple to "fundamental" fantasy, 
"The analyst can then incarnate the object-cause of the analysand's desire, a desire which 
like all desires is structurally perverse, and so expose the jouissance of the analysand: by 
incarnating the object-cause of the analysand's desire, and not of his or her fantasy, the ana-
lyst' incarnates castration in order to separate the analysand from his or her deleterious, mor-
tifying jouissance. (Castration of course is to be understood as a limit to jouissance.)" (italics 
in original) (internal citations omitted). Id. 
IJI See, e.g., Jacqueline Rose, Introduction- II, in JACQUES LACAN, FEMININE SEXUALITY: 
JACQUES LACAN AND THE ECOLE FREUDIENNE 34 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., 
Jacqueline Rose trans., 1985) ("For Freud . . . all instincts are characterized by their aggres-
sion, their tenacity or insistence (exactly their drive). It is this very insistence which places 
the drive outside any register of need, and beyond any economy of pleasure. The drive 
touches on an area of excess (it is 'too much'). Lacan calls this jouissance (literally 'orgasm,' 
but used by Lacan to refer to something more than pleasure which can easily tip into its 
opposite).") (italics in original). See also Voruz, supra note 123, at 267 ("[W]hen Freud 
apprehends the ethical concepts of conscience and morality, he does so in connection with 
the beyond of the pleasure principle. In so doing, he demonstrates the equivalence between 
the superego and the moral law, which are modalities of jouissance."); Voruz, supra note 
123, at 269 ("In Seminar VII Lacan ciphers the beyond of the pleasure principle in the equa-
tion jouissance = ma/ (the French term ma/ means both evil and suffering)."(italics in origi-
nal)). 
132 
"Castration" refers to the interruption of the analysand's fantasy, which in tum subtends 
the analysand's trauma. The trauma's longevity is in some sense pleasurable, hence the word 
"jouissance" to refer to the conflicted relationship (pleasure/orgasm in pain) between patient 
and trauma. The "symptom" is borne of this conflict and leaves its mark on the patient, be-
comes part of who she is. Thus, in analysis, castration occurs when the analyst penetrates and 
interrupts the trajectory of the patient as fixated on the very source of her unconscious desire 
to prolong and enjoy her pain. This "limit" to the jouissance enables the patient to see, more 
objectively, what she is doing, who she "is," in a sense, and to manage her symptom. This 
will enable her to live according to the risk of her desire, now recognized, rather than subject 
to her "symptom." 
133 Jacques-Alain Miller, The Symptom: Knowledge, Meaning and the Real, THE SYMPTOM: 
ONLINE JOURNAL FOR LACAN.COM, http://www.lacan.com/symptom7 _articles/miller.html 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2010). 
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As in theology, the concept of "incarnation" required by the analyst 
to interrupt the patient's traumatic fantasy 134 involves a kind of imaging of 
the "incomprehensible"135 other within analysis. Through the castration, the 
analysand's symptom can then be managed, in its turn, as experienced de-
sire rather than limitless fantasy. The analytical experience is contingent, 
uncertain, open to possibilities, and radically impure, because the (ethical) 
analyst inserts herself, introduces her own "jouissance," her own desire for 
limitless pleasure-her own "way of life"-within the analysis. By exten-
sion, "value" at the center of law may likewise be conceptualized as impure 
and contingent, an interruptive variation on the formal-aesthetic category 
through which lawfare sees law as repository of value. 
A second salient point concerning the "passage" metaphor between 
psychoanalysis and lawfare also hinges on this concept of incarnation: the 
sense in which the transformation inherent to the temporal experience is 
corporeal, involving bodies and flesh. Lawfare, as an expression of the 
asymmetry of modern war, is precisely the "weapon" of a weapon-less oth-
er--compared at least to a weaponized airspace/perimeter. Lawfare is both 
discursive, involving speech acts, and a concretized de-termination (un-
saying) of the fate of the body in view (the enemy noncombatant; the detai-
nee in Abu Ghraib; the civilian "collateral damage" at the border between 
an act of war and a crime; etc.). Whence, lawfare as critique of the war 
model, by analogy to the psychoanalytic experience, is the recognition of 
the body at the center oflaw' s vacuity. In a sense, the genesis of the term, 
even as it points to the normative reduction of law to formal instrument 
within the war paradigm, also points, like the "terminus" of the analytic 
experience, to the limits of war. It points to the carnal horizon of war's 
meaning and value. 
Thus, the end of psychoanalysis, through incarnation of the object-
cause of the other's desire, creates the condition for a "new modality of 
satisfaction" that is singular, i.e. specific to the analysand precisely because 
it is the analysand's desire, and the superegoic jouissance at the core of her 
134 Voruz, supra note 123, at 267 ("In the monist perspective Lacan used the term 'fantasy' 
to 'concentrate everything that pertains to libidinal satisfaction in Freud.' All modalities of 
libidinal satisfaction (including masochism and sadism) are thus referred to the imaginarized 
version of object a organizing the oral, anal, scopic and invocatory drives. This is why La-
can's reflection on ethics in 'Kant with Sade' takes the fantasy as axiom of the subject's 
satisfaction.") (internal citations omitted). 
135 See, e.g., Tanner, supra note 120, at I 18 ("The intent of this essay is to move theologi-
cal anthropology away from this sort of fixation on a fixed human nature, this preoccupation 
with established capacities and given identities, by diagnosing its theological underpinnings, 
and by developing an alternative account of the way humans image God in conversation with 
early Christian thought. I show, thereby, how an apophatic anthropology is the consequence 
of an apophatic theology. If humans are the image of God, they are, as Gregory of Nyssa 
affirmed, an incomprehensible image of the incomprehensible."). 
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fantasy. 136 Voruz writes: "Unlike what the neurotic secretly hopes for in 
analysis, the limitlessness of jouissance is the true horror, not castration, and 
it is the anxiety generated by that limitlessness that prevents the subject 
fi . >/ _J • ,,137 rom actmg out o uesire. 
Although the analogy is not perfect, this idea of limitlessness and 
the anxiety it generates recalls the above discussion of lawfare's projection 
of the war paradigm, and specifically a "war on terror," as perdurable as 
empire. Lacan's theory offers a way to think of "desire," specifically of the 
analyst in relation to the patient, as capturing the capacity to reproduce law-
fare as an alternative to the traditional law/war framework. Like the "neu-
rotic" in Voruz's example, we may secretly hope for "the limitlessness of 
jouissance," the fantasy of unlimited power; this, certainly, was Forman's 
concern in the immanentization of the war metaphor as it traversed the bor-
der between "lex specialis" and "lex generalis." 138 Likewise, Williams criti-
qued a "war" against terrorism as a permanent state of emergency, repro-
ducing law as (mere) "legality."139 And it was intimated in Dunlap's solu-
tion to the problem of the lawfare campaign of the other: "[W]eaponization 
of . .. space." 140 But through the ethical production of an "experienced de-
sire," we might come to see illimitable jouissance as the true horror. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article began as a rhetorical analysis of "lawfare": Dunlap's 
name for a certain kind of warfare characteristic of the modem, post-9111 
U.S. foreign military engagements. I understood Dunlap to mean specific 
things by this term: "lawfarc" is a strategy of war, and this might take the 
form of deploying law as a weapon of war, or of the "perception" of U.S. 
military compliance with the relevant laws of war in order to combat the 
"lawfare campaigns" of the enemy (i.e., the enemy's use of law to combat 
the allies in an asymmetrical armed conflict). As strategy, also, lawfare in-
strumentalized the idea of value at the center of legal adherence. I suggested 
further, however, that the term came out of a quite specific historical con-
text, a period when the discourse on law and war recognized a certain insta-
136 Voruz, supra note 123, at 275 ("As such, the analysand may hope to substitute his or 
her happiness in suffering/evil for a new modality of satisfaction, involving identification 
with his or her symptom that will provide a jouissance extracted from the fantasy."). 
137 Id at 275 (italics in original). For Lacan, the aim is to act "out of desire"- see, e.g., 
Zifok, supra note 119, at l 95 ("The focus of Lacan' s interest rather resides in the paradoxi-
cal reversal by means of which desire itself (i.e. acting upon one' s desire, not compromising 
it, can no longer be grounded in any 'pathological• interest or motivation, and thus meets the 
criteria of the Kantian ethical act, so that 'following one's desire' overlaps with 'doing one's 
duty.'")) (internal citations omitted). 
138 See Voruz, supra note 123 . 
139 Williams, supra note 50, at 381. 
140 Dunlap, supra note I, at 16 (italics in original). 
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bility, as Berman described. 141 That debate in turn was within the context of 
an analysis of American power in a unipolar world, the meaning of its inter-
ventions, and the categorization of its actions abroad, particularly against 
terrorism, as "war." 
The Article then looked at the meanings and significations ascribed 
to the term by its architect, Dunlap, in two essays divided in time by the 
beginning and the "end," at least nominally, of the "war on terror." I looked 
at the texts not only for what they signified explicitly, but what they im-
plied, for their textual commentary on the discourses of war and law, and on 
the exercise of hegemonic power defined, by some commentators, as evi-
dence of a new imperial enterprise or ambition (and pursuant thereto, hege-
monic law as a law of empire). From my analysis, I concluded that lawfare 
seemed ostensibly to ratify the ascendancy of a war paradigm. 
But within the textual interstices, so to speak, "lawfare" also 
seemed to represent something beyond its own semantic intentions. Indeed, 
lawfare suggested, in its neologistic form, something beyond the determi-
nate law-war framework. My attempt in Part IV of the Article was to ex-
tract, through a thought experiment, what it would mean to use "lawfare" to 
think beyond "law and/as war" as a bounded and rather fixed discourse on 
violence. 142 This was not intended to deny the violence of both law and of 
war as such, or inter se. Rather, the aim was to suggest that lawfare's lin-
guistic innovation signifies itself as a passage beyond its discursive con-
fines. Within the psychoanalytic context (as well as theological, in a differ-
ent register), thinking past the limitlessness of the selfs desire, or of the 
selfs desire as unlimited-thinking precisely into a condition of (self-) con-
finement, self-limitation-is the imaginative terminus of the self as discur-
sive object. Put otherwise, it is the achievement of political (i.e., participato-
ry) subjecthood. 143 By analogy, if "lawfare" expresses the tendency of law 
to "think" war, to de-termine itself as war, then lawfare as passage adjacent 
to its intentional meaning posits the capacity for law to think otherwise, or 
relationally. 
But the departure from a specifically juridical analysis of lawfare, a 
dialogic interaction with other disciplinary thought, is already an extra-
juridical encounter that interrupts the bounded perception of law that, I sug-
gest, pervades and perpetuates the status quo. Regarding a relational theory 
oflaw, Mirza writes: 
141 See Berman, supra note 6. 
142 See supra Part N. 
143 Voruz, supra note 123, at 277 ("There is a very clear, absolutely crucial indication on 
the place of jouissance at the end of analysis in Seminar XXIV: jouissance is obtained 
through identification with one' s symptom. And 'to know how to make do with one's symp-
tom, this is the end of analysis' ( 16 November 1976). ") (quoting Lacan, on the inclusion of 
jouissance in the definition of the end of analysis) (internal citations omitted). 
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[L]aw emerges as central to the fonnation of knowledge and social organi-
zation- to the social bond-and as a 'mold or model on the basis of which 
a series of other knowledges- philosophical, rhetorical, and empirical'-
develop. Law's responsive dimension and illimitability are the domains 
where aspects of society can be "interrupted and unmade, reiterated and 
made anew."144 
119 
The advocacy of this Article has been to think of, and indeed to deploy, 
lawfare as a means of interrupting and remaking the thought of law, within 
the shadow of the war paradigm under which we live. 
144 Mirza, supra note 9, at 618 (internal citations to Fitzpatrick an_d Golder omitted). 
